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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE:
THEIR USE AND ENFORCEMENT
IN INDIANA
JOHN W. BOWERS
STACEY L. KATz"
AND
CHARLES W. BACKS
I. INTRODUCTION
As American businesses evolve from being industry driven to being more
service oriented, and the number of employees changing from one job to the
next becomes more common, the need and desire for employers to protect their
interests becomes more pronounced. For these reasons, covenants not to
compete, whether ancillary to an employment contract, or ancillary to the sale
of a business, or standing alone, have become important business documents in
the workplace.' In the absence of such a covenant, an employee may be able
to compete directly with the employer after the employment affiliation has
ended, and may be able to utilize the employer's confidential information while
the employer has little or no recourse.2
A covenant not to compete is, broadly speaking, used in two situations:
first, in, or ancillary to, an employment contract, or second, in connection with
the sale of a business. Indiana courts have treated these two uses quite differ-
ently and have applied separate standards with regard to their enforcement. This
Article addresses covenants not to compete under Indiana law ancillary to both
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the employer/employee relationship3 and the sale of a business.4 The Article
discusses the history of covenants not to compete, 5 the reasonableness
standard, 6  an employer's or buyer's protectible interests, geographic
limitations,' time limitations,9  and severability.'0  Finally, the Article
discusses drafting techniques" and litigation issues. 2
II. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE BETWEEN EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
A. The History of Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to Employment
Contracts Under Indiana Law
Covenants not to compete in employment contracts have been the basis for
litigation since before the discovery of America.' 3  In Indiana, the first
significant case involving a covenant not to compete ancillary to an employment
contract occurred in 1858. " Despite, or perhaps because of this long legal
history, covenants not to compete still present vexing and complicated issues,
often resulting in ambiguous and confusing precedent. This legal confusion
stems at least in part from the tension between a person's freedom to contract
and the public policy which invalidates restraints on trade." If the employer
seeks a covenant not to compete solely to restrain competition, it will be struck
down because "it tends to [result in] a monopoly."6 Accordingly, the
covenant not to compete must anticipate a possible injury the employer would
suffer at the hands of a former employee, as opposed to merely preventing an
employee from competing in the workplace in the future.17
3. See infra text accompanying notes 13-115.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 116-42.
5. See infra section 1I. A., I. A.
6. See infra section H. B.
7. See infra section HI. C., III. B.
8. See infra section II. D., Ill. C.
9. See infra section HI. E., Il. D.
10. See infra section 11. F., L. E.
11. See infra section IV.
12. See infra section IV.
13. Blake, supra note 1, at 631.
14. Duffy v. Shockey, 11 Ind. 70 (1858) (holding that where a contract in restraint of trade is
not general, but applies only to a particular person, within prescribed and reasonable limits, it will
be enforced).
15. Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment
Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 486 (1990).
16. Milgram v. Milgram, 12 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 1938) (citing Homer v. Graves,
131 ENG. REP. 284 (1831)).
17. Field v. Alexander & Alexander of Ind., Inc., 503 N.E.2d 627, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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It is the very act of deciphering each unique set of factual circumstances
and attempting to apply the broad strokes of ideals like "reasonableness" and
"restraints on competition" that so complicates the inquiry into restrictive
covenants. In fact, there are alarmingly few bright line rules draftsmen can look
to for guidance. The most any draftsman can hope for is to understand the
general principles so as to be able, with a healthy dose of intuition, to utilize
them effectively. What follows is an attempt to lay the groundwork for under-
standing how Indiana courts treat this subject.
B. The Reasonableness Standard
The basic principles regarding the reasonableness of a contract in restraint
of trade are stated by Professor Samuel Williston in his treatise on contracts:
It is uniformly agreed that in order to be valid a promise imposing a
restraint in trade or occupation must be reasonable .... The question
of reasonableness is ordinarily for the court, not the jury; however,
there are at times mixed questions of law and fact identified with what
is a reasonable restraint in a given agreement. In considering what is
reasonable, regard must be paid to: (1) The question whether the
promise is broader than is necessary for the protection of the
covenantee in some legitimate interest; (2) The effect of the promise
upon the covenantor, and (3) The effect of the promise or agreement
upon the public welfare or common good."
Although the question of "reasonableness" is deemed to be one of law and,
thus, for the courts to decide, it must be decided based upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case. Thus, the student of restrictive covenants
is confronted with an anomoly: although the question of reasonableness is
ultimately one of law, it is premised upon the facts existing as of the date of
attempted enforcement.' 9
Indiana courts, like those of most states, adopted Williston's reasonableness
standard for judging restrictive covenants. Illustrative is Donahue v. Permacel
Tape Corp. , in which the court stated that a covenant is considered valid and
reasonable if the following three criteria are met: first, the restraint is reasonably
necessary to protect the employer; second, the restraint is not unreasonably
18. 14 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLUSTON ON CONTRACTS § 1636, at 88-93 (Walter H. E. Jaeger
ed., 3d. ed. 1972).
19. Frederick v. Professional Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 344 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976).
20. 127 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. 1955).
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restrictive of an employee; and, third, the restraint does not violate public
policy.2
In making a determination of reasonableness, a court will first consider the
business interests of the employer which might be protected by the covenant.
The court will then examine the employer's proffered business interests so as to
determine whether the duration, the geographic area, and the types of activity
proscribed by the covenant are reasonable.' "It is the interrelation of the
considerations of protectible interest, time, space, and proscribed activity that
make a particular covenant reasonable or unreasonable. "2
C. An Employer's Protectible Interest
Before a court can enforce a covenant, it must know why the covenant was
needed. In other words, the employer must define what its interests are that
require protection via a restrictive covenant. The court must then determine
whether the proffered reasons are reasonable under the circumstances.' Valid
reasons include an employer's use of a restrictive covenant to preserve such
property rights as good will, trade secrets, and confidential information.z
"Good Will" is defined to include: names, addresses, and requirements of
customers; price information; and the advantageous familiarity and personal
contact which the employees derived from their dealings with customers.'
Confidential information is defined to mean information not generally known
outside the employer's company, which relates to the employer's business, and
is disclosed to or known by the employee as a consequence of, or through, his
21. Id. at 239.
22. 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
23. Frederick, 344 N.E.2d at 302. The court in Frederick went on to say that "[t]his is true
even though in a given case the breadth of a single restriction may appearto dominate the outcome."
Id.
24. Captain & Co., Inc. v. Towne, 404 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
25. Id. at 1162.
26. Losure, 373 N.E.2d at 901. Here, Losure, as a salesman for 4408, Inc., personally sold
about seventy percent of the firm's accounts, or seven hundred accounts. Losure's duties as Sales
Manager included soliciting new accounts, maintaining the old ones, and creating good will. The
court held that this familiarity with customers and their accounts was an interest that would justify
a protectible interest for the employer. Id. See also Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d
235 (Ind. 1955). In Donahue, the court stated that elements of good will include names, addresses
and requirements of customers and the advantage acquired through representative contact with the
trade in the area of their application. Id. at 240. "These are property rights which the employer
is entitled to protect." Id.
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or her employment.' Finally, trade secret is defined by the Indiana Uniform
Trade Secrets Act to mean
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that: (1) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.'
The definition of trade secrets is further supplemented by the Restatement of
Torts, which provides that a "trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it. "'
In Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc. ,'o the court examined whether
the employer's supplier list, customer list and pricing data constituted trade
secrets sufficient to justify enforcement of a restrictive covenant.3 The court
held that Kimball's supplier list, customer lists, and pricing data constituted
"information" which derived independent value and which were not "readily
ascertainable," because the information was not commonly known or available
outside of Kimball's business and because the information was difficult for
Kimball's competitors to obtain.32 The court found such "independent value"
because Kimball's competitors would benefit either by obtaining a "competitive
edge" or "some advantage" from acquiring the pricing, supplier or customer
information.33 Therefore, the court held that the supplier list, customer list,
and pricing data were trade secrets.
27. 2 Louis ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES
§ 14.11-12 (4th ed. 1982).
28. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-2 (West 1995). To have a protectible trade secret the following
four criteria must be met: (1) the trade secret must consist of information; (2) the information must
derive independent economic value; (3) the information must not be generally known, or readily
ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use; and (4) reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, must have been made to maintain the
information's secrecy. Id.
29. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
30. 634 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
31. Id. at 780.
32. Id. at 782-83. Kimball also took reasonable efforts to keep secret the supplier list, customer
list, and pricing data. Id.
33. Id.
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Not all employer interests are protectible by a restrictive covenant. The
skill the employee has obtained from the employer, or the basic knowledge or
experience the employee has acquired by working for the employer, which is not
directly associated with the good will or value of the employer's business, is
considered a non-protectible interest. 3 Therefore, when the employer/employee
relationship is terminated, the employee has a right to take the skills or
knowledge gained from the employment with him or her (with the exception of
trade secrets or confidential information). 5 Even in the absence of a restrictive
covenant, an employee may not use trade secrets or confidential information
against his or her former employer.
It is often difficult, however, for an employer to establish that it did in fact
invest the employee with trade secrets or confidential information. In American
Shippers v. Campbell,' American Shippers, an Ohio corporation, maintained
an office in Indianapolis, Indiana. The company sold shipping room supplies
and equipment in a very tight and extremely competitive market. The
defendant, Campbell, was an employee of American Shippers. He was
responsible for soliciting sales for supplies and equipment for the entire state of
Indiana. Campbell later resigned and began working for a competitor of
American Shippers. There was evidence that Campbell misappropriated
information contained on customer file cards and that he informed former
customers of American Shippers that he was no longer with the company and
was working for a competitor.
Contrary to the Ackerman court, the American Shippers court found that the
customer lists were not confidential and not protected because they could be
acquired through a telephone book or trade publication." Actually, because
the customer file cards were readily available to all American Shippers
employees, the information contained on the cards was not regarded as
confidential.' Despite the fact that American Shippers engaged in the sale of
non-unique products, it argued that Campbell should be bound by the covenant
because American Shippers' business depended on the personal service
performed by its salespersons.39 The court, while acknowledging that there are
cases where the highly personalized nature of the contract between a salesperson
34. Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 1955). Note, however, that
the knowledge of trade secrets and confidential information is still a protectible employer interest.
Id.
35. Id. Consequently, an employee may contract to conditionally waive these individual
achievements as consideration for his or her employment only where their use, adverse to the
employer, would result in irrevocable impairment to the employer. Id.
36. 456 N.E.2d 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
37. Id. at 1044.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1043-44.
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and customers can create a protectible interest on behalf of an employer,
rejected American Shippers' assertion that such an interest was created.' The
court noted that no personal relationship existed between Campbell and
American Shippers' clientele, that American Shippers' customers did not depend
on any special skill or knowledge utilized by Campbell, and that American
Shippers' customers did not care about the salespersons with whom they dealt,
but were only concerned with the product they were purchasing.4' The court
held that when a customer list does not constitute confidential information, the
employer must demonstrate some other protectible interest in the information.
42
American Shippers is instructive to employers who require or have
contemplated requiring their employees to execute restrictive covenants. It is
not enough to pay lip service to the idea of confidentiality. If information can
be easily duplicated or acquired, it is probably not confidential. In the absence
of confidential information or trade secrets, an employer must be able to
establish some other "protectible interest" sufficient to justify a restraint on
competition. The fact that an employee performed his or her job and performed
it well is not enough to prohibit the employee from competing once the
employment has ended. The employer must be able to establish something more
because "unsubstantiated claims of '[h]ighly specialized training and personal
supervision in connection with the sales of ordinary merchandise well known in
the market . . . are statements too general in nature to constitute ground[s] for
legal relief.'"'
40. Id. at 1044.
41. American Shippers Supply Co. v. Campbell, 456 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
Miller v. Frankfort Bottle Gas, Inc. is distinguishable because the court in Miller found a protectible
interest where the employee, a salesman, had a personal relationship with the employer's customers,
and the customers stopped doing business with the employer when the employee was terminated by
the employer. Miller v. Frankfort Bottle Gas, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1964). Another factor
the court in Miller used to determine that there was no protectible interest was the fact that a loss
of customers was very unusual in the bottled gas industry. Id.
42. American Shippers Supply Co., 456 N.E.2d at 1045. The court noted that in most cases
customer lists are regarded as confidential information. Id. at 1044. However, the court cited
Licocci v. Cardinal Assoc., Inc., in which the Licocci court found that
[a]lthough Cardinal Associates may have considered its customer lists confidential, no
evidence indicated these lists could have been used to undercut competition or could not
easily have been duplicated by alternate means, such as a telephone canvass of the
market area. Neither was there evidence the information given salesmen was novel or
unique to Cardinal Associates so as to constitute a protectible trade secret.
Licocci v. Cardinal Assoc., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983).
43. American Shippers Supply Co., 456 N.E.2d at 1044 (citing Club Aluminum Co. v. Young,
160 N.E. 804, 806 (Mass. 1928)).
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D. Geographic Limitations
In order to be enforceable, the geographic limitation contained in a
restrictive covenant must be confined to what is "reasonably necessary" to
protect the employer's interests." Accordingly, courts will find a geographic
limitation invalid if the restriction reaches beyond what is necessary to protect
the employer's business interests.' However, there is an exception to the
general rule of having a specific time limitation in a restrictive covenant. In
Ebbeskotte v. Tyler,' the court explained this exception. There, the restrictive
covenant did not have a time restriction and did not restrict the employee from
working in the same area where the employer was established.47 The covenant
only restricted the employee from soliciting and accepting employment directly
or indirectly from the employer's clients.' The court held that even though
the restrictive covenant was unlimited as to duration, it was narrowly limited in
geographical area and was therefore enforceable.49 The applicable question is
what is necessary to protect the employer. In this sense, it is really impossible
to separate the discussion of geographic restrictions from that of the employer's
interest in prohibiting competition. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some
generalizations.
A geographic limitation extending to the full extent of the employer's
business activity is rarely enforceable. Most reported decisions in Indiana allow
the covenant to extend only to those areas in which the employee has actually
performed work for the employer. Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc. ,50
however, illustrates an exception to this rule. In Ackerman, the court enforced
a reasonable covenant which restricted the employee from using or disclosing
44. 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
45. Mantek v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1985) (restrictive covenant was not limited
to customers and potential customers with whom the employee had contact while working for the
employer); Schlumberger Well Serv. v. Blaker, 623 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (the entire
North American continent); Cap Gemini Am., Inc. v. Judd, 597 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(all states in which the employer does business; Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio); Commercial Bankers
Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 516 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (same); College Life Ins. Co. v.
Austin, 466 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (no geographic limitation and no sufficient class of
people); Frederick v. Professional Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 344 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976)
(eight counties, when employee did not work in all eight counties).
46. 142 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 1957).
47. Id. at 907.
48. Id. at 909.
49. Id. The court supported its argument using O'Neal v. Hines, which stated that "a contract,
reasonably limited as to the territory in which the specific business is not to be carried on, is not
rendered invalid because the restriction as to time is indefinite or general." O'Neal v. Hines, 145
Ind. 32, 35 (1895).
50. 634 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
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confidential information to the full extent of the employer's business."I The
plaintiff signed an agreement which provided that Kimball would continue
Ackerman's employment in exchange for Ackerman's promise not to compete,
directly or indirectly, with Kimball for one year following his termination.52
The covenant contained no geographic limitation. At the time he signed the
covenant, Ackerman was an executive Vice-President at Kimball and oversaw
the operations of the company's plants.
Ackerman was subsequently demoted to general manager of a single plant
and managed the day-to-day operations of that plant. Despite his demotion,
Ackerman had in his possession a comprehensive supplier list, a customer list,
and pricing data for the Evansville, Indiana plant. In 1993, he was terminated
by Kimball. He later signed a termination agreement, agreeing not to use
Kimball's trade secrets. 53  Shortly thereafter, Kimball discovered that
Ackerman was looking for employment with competitors of Kimball.
After acknowledging that Ackerman was in possession of trade secrets, the
court addressed the issue of whether the lack of a geographic limitation rendered
the restrictive covenant invalid.' The court held that when an employee
obtains or is entrusted with the trade secrets of his employer, that employee may
enter into a valid covenant with the employer which forbids the employee from
"the competitive use or disclosure of such trade secrets to the full extent of the
affected area of the business of the employer." 55  Accordingly, a restrictive
covenant that prohibits the employee from using or disclosing trade secrets is not
invalid simply because it limits the competitive employment of an employee
51. Id. at 782.
52. Id. at 781. The Employment Agreement provided as follows:
1. Employer agrees to employ or continue to employ Employee at the salary or wage
as now or from time to time agreed on. Nothing herein contained shall affect the right
of either party to terminate Employee's employment with Kimball International, Inc. at
any time . . . . 3. Employee agrees that he will carefully guard and keep all
information, knowledge or data of Employer or of any customer of Employer which
Employee may obtain during the course of his employment, and further agrees that he
will not disclose at any time any such information, knowledge or data of Employer or
any customer of Employer to others, except such information, knowledge or data as may
be generally known to the public. 4. Employee agrees that he will not, without prior
written consent of Employer, either during the period of his employment or within one
year after the termination thereof, become directly or indirectly engaged in inventing,
improving, designing, developing or manufacturing, any products directly competitive
with the products of Employer.
Id.
53. Id. In return for signing the termination agreement, Kimball gave Ackerman a "transitional
salary allowance" of $15,000.00 and other benefits. Id.
54. Id. at 782.
55. Id. (citing Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Ind. 1955)).
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beyond the area of his or her former employment. 5 Ackerman may be read
as standing for the proposition that, despite the absence of a geographic
limitation in a covenant, the covenant may still be reasonable and enforceable.
Aside from establishing possession of trade secrets, it is possible to draft
an enforceable covenant without specifying a specific geographic scope. This
can be done by increasing the specificity of the class of persons with whom
contact is prohibited. With this done, the need for a limitation expressed in
territorial terms decreases.5" Therefore, using this approach, if the limitation
of the class of people is specific enough, no geographic limitation is needed.'
It should be noted that meeting this specificity requirement may be difficult.
In Commercial Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Smith,59 the Indiana Court of
Appeals held that the covenant not to compete was invalid because it did not
contain defined, geographic boundaries, and the class of persons with whom
contact was prohibited was not well defined.' The court found that the only
geographic limitation in the covenant, which Smith signed, restricted him from
56. Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l Inc., 634 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Similarly,
in Waterfield Mortgage Co., Inc., v. O'Connor, the court stated:
[Wihere an employee is not privy to confidential information, a covenant restricting his
employment beyond the area of his former employment is unreasonable. However, if
an employee obtained confidential information, he may be restricted in the competitive
use and disclosure of such information to the full extent of the employer's business
which is thereby affected.
Waterfield Mortgage Co., Inc., v. O'Connor, 361 N.E.2d 924, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
57. Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
58. Field v. Alexander& Alexander of Ind., Inc., 503 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
The covenant at issue in Field consisted of the following:
In consideration of the Corporation entering into this agreement, which you accept by
your signature below, and for other good and valuable consideration, you agree that if
your employment with the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates should
terminate for any reason, you will not, for a period of two years after that date of such
termination, in any capacity whatsoever (including, but not limited to, as an employee,
officer, director, stockholder, proprietor, partner, joint venturer, consultant or
otherwise), directly or indirectly, solicit, sell, service, divert, accept or receive
insurance agency, brokerage or consulting business or actuarial or employee benefits
(Benefacts) business, or property tax consulting business, from, or to, any customer or
active prospect of the Corporation, or any of its affiliates or subsidiaries, which you
personally, alone or in combination with others, handled, serviced or solicited at any
time during the two year period immediately preceding termination of your employment.
Id.
59. 516 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
60. Id. at 113.
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"directly or indirectly competing within the area of his responsibility."' The
court concluded that under Indiana law a court cannot rewrite a restrictive
covenant, and since the restrictive covenant contained no geographic limitations
or defined any geographic boundaries, the restrictive covenant was void and
unenforceable. 2 In order for the Smith court to have found a valid restrictive
covenant without a geographic limitation, the covenant must have only restricted
Smith from contacting customers with whom Smith had contact during his
employment with Commercial Bankers.6
3
Absent a showing that the employee was entrusted with confidential
information, the great weight of authority in Indiana allows geographic
limitations to extend only as far as the area in which the employee has worked,
or in which the employee has made customer contact.' By way of example,
in 4408, Inc. v. Losure,65 the covenant's scope did not exceed the employee's
area of work but prohibited him from competing in all counties where he had
worked. 6 The court held that the restrictive covenant's geographic limitation
was valid and reasonable.67
Professionals, such as doctors, have often presented vexing business and
ethical concerns to Indiana courts when their former employers or partners seek
to restrict their access to patients or clients. Interestingly, a covenant which
restricts the provision of medical services in a proscribed area is not, per se,
void as against public policy.' Indiana courts have upheld as reasonable
restrictive covenants which cover the entire area of a clinic's business, even
61. Id. The covenant at issue in Smith consisted of the following:
It is anticipated that Dave and the Company will enjoy a mutually advantageous and
profitable relationship for many years, but should this relationship be terminated, Dave
agrees that as a condition of employment as Vice President in charge of Sales and
Marketing of the Company and in consideration of the Company's other covenants and
agreements herein contained, that for a term equal to his length of employment as Vice
President in charge of Sales and Marketing of the Company or in any other future
capacity, but in no case less that one (1) year or more than three (3) years immediately
after the termination of his employment with the Company he will not, directly or
indirectly, compete with the Company within the areas of his responsibilities by
performing services for any other concern which is in competition with the Company,
whereby such competition in the opinion of the Company would be injurious to the
Company ..
Id.
62. Id. at 113-15.
63. An example of a covenant which illustrates a case where geographic boundaries are not
needed to create a valid restrictive covenant is found at supra note 52.
64. E.g., 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
65. 373 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. App. 1978).
66. Id. at 902.
67. Id.
68. E.g., Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 1983).
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though the doctor who is restricted treats patients who come from only part of
the total area of the clinic's business.' This can be distinguished from the
situations discussed above in which courts will generally only enforce a covenant
as reasonable to the extent of an employee's work.' In each of five recent
decisions involving covenants not to compete to which a doctor was a party, the
covenant has been upheld as reasonable.
Medical Specialists, Inc., v. Sleweon7" is Indiana's leading case dealing
with the reasonableness of geographic limitations in a covenant to which a
doctor is a party. In Sleweon, Dr. Sleweon, an employee of Medical Specialists
("Specialists"), practiced infectious disease medicine. Specialists serviced
patients from ten hospitals in the northwest part of Indiana.' Sleweon signed
a covenant not to compete with Specialists in which he agreed not to compete
with Specialists within a ten-mile radius of the hospitals at which Specialists
rendered patient services. Sleweon resigned and began working for hospitals
that Specialist serviced, as well as hospitals that Specialists did not service, but
which were within the geographic restriction contained in the covenant. 3
Despite the fact that the covenant prohibited competition in areas where the
employer conducted no business, the court upheld all of the agreement's
competitive restrictions. 74
In so holding, the Sleweon court relied upon Fumo v. Medical Group of
Michigan City,75 in which the court held that a covenant was not overbroad
merely because it included hospitals in addition to those serviced by the
employer.76 The court in Fumo reasoned that when individuals travel to
receive offered services, an employer may have a protectible interest extending
over a geographical area greater than that previously serviced by the employee,
particularly where the medical corporation has a "substantial patient base within
the proscribed area."' Similarly, the Sleweon court found that patients
traveled from Illinois in addition to Lake, Porter, LaPorte, Starke, St. Joseph,
and Jasper Counties in Indiana.' Thus, the court held that the geographical
restriction was reasonable even though it extended into Illinois and covered
hospitals not served by Specialists.Y9
69. See Medical Specialists, Inc. v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
70. See supra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
71. 652 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
72. Id. at 520.
73. Id. at 521.
74. Id. at 528.
75. 590 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
76. Id. at 1109.
77. Id. (citing Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).
78. Medical Specialists, Inc. v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
79. Id.
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In finding the covenant's geographic scope reasonable, the Sleweon court
noted that it normally would only consider whether a substantial patient base
existed within the proscribed area.s' Because the infectious disease practice
was mainly dependent upon patient referrals from other doctors, however, as
opposed to patient preference and selection, 8' the court recognized that the
employer's main business interest was to protect its referral source (the
hospitals) from Dr. Sleweon's competition.' Thus, the court held that
Specialists did not have to prove that it had a "substantial patient base within the
proscribed area" in order to have a reasonable geographic restriction.' The
restrictive covenant, as drafted, was valid.
Despite the willingness of Indiana courts to broadly enforce restrictive
covenants involving doctors, the court in Funo v. Medical Group of Michigan
City? noted that public policy problems are presented by such a practice. 5
The court stated that, "[w]here a specialist offers services uniquely or sparsely
available in a specified geographical area, an injunction may be unwarranted
because the movant is unable to meet the burden of showing that the public
would not be disserved."" Although the Sleweon court downplayed this
factor, finding that the area would not be underserved by prohibiting Sleweon
from practicing, employers should recognize that courts are willing to examine
this factor.
80. Id. (citing Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 590 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
85. Id. at 1109.
86. Id. However, in Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., the court stated:
In the absence of a showing that any particular contract brought before the court is
contrary to what the Constitution, the Legislature, or the judiciary have declared to be
the public policy, it is necessary in order to have the court hold it void on the ground
of public policy, to show clearly that such contract has a tendency to injure the public,
or is against the public good, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals as
to the consideration or as to the thing to be done or not to be done. Whether or not a
contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine from all
of the circumstances in a particular case. The courts will keep in mind the principle that
it is to the best interest of the public that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted
in their freedom of contract and that their agreements are not to be held void as against
public policy, unless they are clearly contrary to what the Constitution, the Legislature,
or the judiciary have declared to be the public policy, or unless they clearly tend to the
injury of the public in some way.
Hodnickv. Fidelity Trust Co., 183 N.E. 488, 491 (nd. App. 1932).
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E. Time Limitations
Like the geographic scope, the duration of a restrictive covenant must be
reasonable in order to be enforceable. In fact, unlike covenants that lack
specific geographic boundaries but may still be enforceable, a covenant must
contain definite temporal limitations in order to be enforceable. An indefinite
time restraint can render a covenant not to compete void and unenforceable.
a7
The reasonableness of a time restraint is generally judged using three
criteria. First, the length of the restraint must relate to the employer's
protectible interest." As with all other aspects of a restrictive covenant, if this
requirement is not met, then the duration of the restraint is automatically
unreasonable and no further inquiry into the next two criteria is necessary."
The case of Captain and Co., Inc. v. Towne' illustrates this issue. In Towne,
the court found the covenant to be reasonable with the exception of the time
restraint. 91 The court concluded that a two-year time restraint on Towne, who
estimated insurance clean-up work, was unreasonable because Towne possessed
no confidential information, customer lists, or trade secrets.
92
Second, the restraint must not be so long in time as to injure the employee
by precluding that person from pursuing his or her occupation as a means for
support." This could present a problem for the employer where the employee
has specialized skills that do not translate well into another field and where the
employer's market and, therefore area of interest, is national or global. In such
a case, it may well be impossible to draft an enforceable covenant which fully
protects all of the employer's interests. Such a covenant would, in effect,
deprive the employee of the ability to earn a living for the specified time.
Finally, in order to be deemed reasonable, the restraint must not be so long
in time as to interfere with the interests of the general public by depriving it of
the restricted party's industry or services.' At what point the public itself has
an interest that is paramount to that of the employer is unclear; however, the
87. Harvest Ins. Agency v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Ind. 1986).
88. Frederick v. Professional Bldg. Maintenance Indus., Inc., 344 N.E.2d 299, 302 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976).
89. C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to
Employment Contract, as Affected by Duration of Restriction, 41 A.L.R.2D 15, 34-35 (1955).
90. 404 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1162.
93. Drechsler, supra note 89, at 39-40.
94. Id. at 40.
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physician cases discussed above95 would provide fertile ground for such a
public policy argument.
Once again, a court's evaluation of what will be deemed "reasonable" terms
within a restrictive covenant must be made on a case-by-case basis. In making
that determination, a court must balance the employer's right to protect its
investment against the employee's right to earn a living. Indiana courts have
upheld restrictions of one year,% eighteen months, 97 two years, 9  three
years, 99 and five years"°° as reasonable.
F. Severability: The Blue Pencil Doctrine
The last, and perhaps most important, aspect in understanding covenants not
to compete in Indiana is the "blue pencil doctrine." This judicial device
emanates from the tradition of striking, or "penciling out," void, offensive or
unreasonable language in a contract without rendering the entire agreement
unenforceable. Thus, where a restrictive covenant contains both reasonable and
unreasonable restrictions, the excessive or unreasonable portions may be
disregarded or severed from the remainder, and the reasonable restrictions may
be enforced by crossing out any overbroad clauses.' 0' This enables courts to
give effect to the parties' intentions, if practicable. " If, however, a covenant
is deemed unreasonable and the court is not able to sever the unreasonable parts
95. See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
96. Licocci v. Cardinal Assoc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 562 (Ind. 1983); Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l.
Co., 634 N.E.2d 778, 786 ([nd. Ct. App. 1994); Franke v. Honeywell, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1090,
1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
97. Mantek v. Share Corp., 780 F.2d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 1986)
98. Barnes Group v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 463 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Field v. Alexander,
503 N.E.2d 627, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
99. Leatherman v. Management Advisors, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind. 1983); Smart
Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Hahn v. Drees, Perngini & Co., 581
N.E.2d 457,460-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 217
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982); 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 373 N.E.2d 899, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
100. Rollins v. American State Bank, 487 N.E.2d 842, 843-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Miller
v. Frankfort Bottle Gas, 202 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1964).
101. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 173 (6th ed. 1990).
102. Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). In Seach,
an employee had covenanted not to compete with any present, past or prospective client of the
employer. Id. at 209. The court concluded that the past and future restrictions were too broad and
vague, but enforced the restrictions against the employer's present clients. Id. at 214. "Although
the words 'present, past or prospective' client appear throughout the non-competition clause, we can
enforce the acceptable portion of that phrase which applies to present clients of the Firm as they are
a protectible interest." Id. at 215.
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without rewriting the entire covenant, the blue pencil doctrine will not apply and
the court will find that the entire restrictive covenant is unenforceable. 10 3
In Smart Corp. v. Grider,""° Grider was employed by Smart Corporation
as an Area Manager for the entire state of Indiana. Smart Corporation provided
medical record copying services to hospitals and other health care providers.'05
Grider's responsibilities were limited solely to Indiana but the restrictive
covenant that she signed required her not to compete with Smart anywhere in
the United States for three years."°  Two years later Grider was terminated
by Smart. Soon after her termination, she began working for one of Smart's
competitors, taking with her twenty of Smart's Indiana clients. 10 7 After
concluding that the restrictive covenant was unreasonable as written, the court
examined whether it could be "blue penciled.""~ The court held that the
parties' intentions could be enforced by redacting the overbroad geographical
limitation from the employment contract without adding any new terms or
subjecting the parties to a contract lacking mutual consent, thereby giving effect
to the parties' reasonable intent." 9
In Licocci v. Cardinal Associates, Inc., o the court examined a covenant
composed of three parts: (1) Licocci was prohibited from soliciting sales from
anyone in his former territories for sixty (60) days; (2) he was prohibited for
sixty (60) days from calling upon, talking to, or soliciting any business from any
customer of Cardinal Associates within or outside his former territories; and (3)
he was prohibited from selling the same products to any of his former customers
103. Licocci v. Cardinal Assoc., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 1983). See also Wiley v.
Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66, 69 (1884).
104. 650 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The covenant at issue in Smart read as follows:
The Employee hereby covenants and agrees that so long as she is either employed by
the Company or for the term of this Agreement, and for the lessor of: (i) three (3) years
after the Employee ceases to be employed by the Company or any affiliate or successor
thereof; or (ii) so long as the Company or any affiliate or successor thereof carries on
a like business to that presently conducted by the Company, the Employee will not, in
any county or any state in the United States of America where the Company or any
affiliate or successor thereof then carries on a like business to that presently conducted
by the Company in the County of Los Angeles, California, to the extent permitted by
applicable law, ...[compete with Smart).
Id. at 84.
105. Id. at 82.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 84.
109. Id. The court surgically removed the following language from the restrictive covenant:
"in any county of any state in the United States of America where the Company or any affiliate or
successor thereof then carries on a like business to that presently conducted by the Company in the
County of Los Angeles, California .. . ." Id.
110. 445 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1983).
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for one year."' The court, applying the blue pencil doctrine, held that the
third restriction was reasonable and could be enforced independently of the other
two. 
112
Frederick v. Professional Building Maintenance Industries, Inc., 1
illustrates a rejection of the use of the blue pencil doctrine. In Frederick, the
restrictive covenant involved eight Indiana, Michigan and Illinois counties:
Lake, Porter, LaPorte and St. Joseph in Indiana; Berrien and Van Buren in
Michigan; and Will and Cook in Illinois."4 The court in Frederick found the
restraint to be overbroad and refused to give it validity by striking out those
counties in which Frederick had had no activity." 5 The court refused to find
that each county was a severable and individual geographical limitation and,
therefore, declined to enforce the covenant as drafted.
III. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE AND THE SALE OF A BUSINESS
A. The History of Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to a Sale of a Business
Under Indiana Law
Since 1884, Indiana courts have recognized the enforceability of covenants
not to compete incidental to the sale of a business." 6 Indiana courts have
111. Id. at 562. The covenant at issue in Licocci read as follows:
[The Representative does agree that for a period of sixty (60) days from and after the
termination of this Contract the said Representative shall not engage in any business or
activities, which directly or indirectly compete in anyway [sic] with the business and
activities of the Corporation within the territory assigned to the Representative under this
Contract; that the Representative will not for a period of Sixty (60) days from and after
the termination of this Contract by either party as hereinafter setforth [sic] call upon,
talk with or solicit any business from any customers of the Corporation within or outside
the territory of the Representative as hereinafter setforth [sic]; and further that the
Representative will not for a period of one year from and after the term of this contract
by either party as herinafter [sic] set forth engage in, participate in, or in any way assist
anyone else, directly or indirectly, selling to customers [sic] to whom said representative
sold products during the time he was engaged as a Representative of Cardinal Associates
Midwest, Inc. any product which is either identical to or essentially the same product
as those products said Representative sold to that particular customer while he was
representing Cardinal Associates Midwest, Inc.
Id. at 560-61.
112. Id. at 564.
113. 344 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
114. Id. at 301.
115. Id. at 302.
116. Buanno v. Wienraub, 81 N.E.2d 600 (Ind. 1948); Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker, 195
N.E. 277 (Ind. 1935); Bennett v. Carmichael Produce Co., 115 N.E. 793 (Ind. 1916); Eisel v.
Hayes, 40 N.E. 119 (Ind. 1895); Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 41 N.E. 1048 (Ind. 1895);
Beatty v. Coble, 41 N.E. 590 (Ind. 1895); Wiley v. Baumgardner, 97 Ind. 66 (1884); R.P. Davis,
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established different criteria for reviewing and enforcing covenants ancillary to
the sale of a business as opposed to those ancillary to employment contracts.
Courts are less likely to enforce restrictive covenants in employment
contracts because an employee usually has little, if any, bargaining power. 17
On the other hand, because of the presumed equality of bargaining power
between a buyer and a seller of a business, and because the buyer is paying for
the "goodwill" associated with the seller's business, which goodwill is often
related to the seller personally, courts are more likely to enforce restrictive
covenants incident to the sale of a business. In other words, a covenant
ancillary to the sale of a business merely protects a buyer's investment,
11 8
much of which may be in the business' goodwill.'19 For that reason, although
Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Contracts of Employment, 98
A.L.R. 963 (1935).
117. The reasons for this distinction are well stated in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy,
488 N.E.2d 22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986), which is accepted by the Indiana courts. The court in
Alexander reasoned as follows:
In the former situation [sale of a business] there is more likely to be equal bargaining
power between the parties; the proceeds of the sale generally enable the seller to support
himself temporarily without the immediate practical need to enter into competition with
his former business; and a seller is usually paid a premium for agreeing not to compete
with the buyer. Where the sale of the business includes good will, as this sale did, a
broad noncompetition agreement may be necessary to assure that the buyer receives that
which he purchased.. .. On the other hand, an ordinary employee typically has only
his own labor or skills to sell and often is not in a position to bargain with his employer.
Postemployment restraints in such cases must be scrutinized carefully to see that they
go no further than necessary to protect an employer's legitimate interests, such as trade
secrets or confidential customer information.
Id. at 28. See also C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Enforceability of Covenant Against Competition,
Ancillary to Sale or Other Transfer of Business, Practice, or Property, as Affected by Territorial
Extent of Restriction, 46 A.L.R.2o 119 (1956); WILLISTON, supra note 18, at 122.
118. McCart v. H & R Block, Inc., 470 N.E.2d 756, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
119. "Good will," in this context, means "[tihe favor which the management of a business wins
from the public. [It is] [tlhe fixed and favorable consideration of customers arising from established
and well-conducted business .... Good will is an intangible asset. [It is] [s]omething in business
which gives reasonable expectancy of preference in [the] race of competition." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 625 (STH ED. 1979). Good will can also mean
[t]he custom or patronage of any established trade or business; the benefit or advantage
of having established a business and secured its patronage by the public. . . . And as
property incident to business sold, favor [which a] vendor has won from [the] public,
and [the] probability that all customers will continue their patronage. It means every
advantage, every positive advantage, that has been acquired by a proprietor in carrying
on his business, whether connected with the premises in which the business is
conducted, or with the name under which it is managed, or with any other matter
carrying with it the benefit of the business.
Id. Good will is "[t]he ability of a business to generate income in excess of a normal rate on assets
due to superior managerial skills, market position, new product technology, etc. In the purchase
of a business, good will represents the difference between the purchase price and the value of the
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the same test of reasonableness is used to judge covenants ancillary to the sale
of a business, it is applied in a somewhat less stringent manner. Thus, a
restriction might be reasonable as applied to the seller of a business, but may be
found unreasonable as applied to a former employee.
B. A Buyer's Protectible Interest
The primary difference between enforcement of a restrictive covenant
ancillary to the sale of a business and one ancillary to an employment contract
is the manner in which the court analyzes the "protectible interest." The first
step in analyzing a covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of a business
is to determine whether a protectible interest has been purchased." : In many
cases, the parties, by the terms of their purchase agreement, will specifically
provide that there is a protectible interest in the goodwill of the seller's
business.12 Even if the parties do not agree, if the buyer purchases the
goodwill associated with the seller's business, the court will find a protectible
interest. Accordingly, a protectible interest in the sale of a business is much
easier to show than a protectible interest in an employment contract.
C. Geographic Limitations
Indiana courts are also more indulgent regarding the reasonableness of
geographic limitations in restrictive covenants ancillary to the sale of a
business."i Nevertheless, of all the elements of reasonableness, court have
most closely examined the element of geographic limitations. 123  Like
covenants ancillary to employment contracts, the geographic limitations must not
be broader than necessary to protect the buyer's interest.
Fogle v. Shah" is the leading Indiana case analyzing restrictive
covenants incident to the sale of a business. In Fogle, Shah wanted to buy
net assets." Id. The court, in Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler, defined the goodwill of a
business as an intangible asset which may be transferred from seller to purchaser, and it becomes
the buyer's right to expect the firm's established customers will continue to patronize the purchased
business. Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler, 419 N.E.2d 324, 329 (N.Y. 1981).
120. Pickett v. Pelican Serv. Assocs., 481 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
121. See supra notes 119-20.
122. Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co., 439 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). See
also Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Restrictive Covenant not to
Compete Ancillary to Franchise Agreement, 50 A.L.R.3D 746, 749 (1973).
123. Ridgefield Park Transp. v. Uhl, 803 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (S.D. Ind. 1992). In Uhl, the
court found a restrictive covenant ancillary to the sale of a business overbroad and unreasonable
because it restricted the entire United States when the seller only occasionally hauled freights across
the United States; the seller's business mainly consisted of serving a few major clients over
established routes. Id. at 1470.
124. 539 N.E.2d 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
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Fogle and Associates ("F & A"), a pension consulting firm, from the Fogies.
Shah agreed to pay the Fogies a total of $1,000,000 for F & A, with $850,000
paid for the company and $150,000 paid for the covenants not to compete. 125
The restrictive covenants signed by the Fogies contained a three-year time
restraint covering twelve states.' 26 About one year after the sale, the Fogies
formed a competing pension consulting business and started contacting F&A's
former clients. 27  The Fogle court examined three factors to determine
whether a restrictive covenant ancillary to the sale of a business is overbroad as
to time, space, or the activity restricted: 128 "(a) whether the covenant is
broader than necessary for the protection of the covenantee... [buyer] in some
legitimate interest, (b) the effect of the covenant upon the covenantor . . .
[seller], and (c) the effect of the covenant upon the public interest. "29
There are four factors to be considered in determining whether the covenant
is necessary for the protection of the buyer: (1) the type of business sold, (2)
the inclusion of territory into which the transferring business did not extend, (3)
the extent of the purchaser's original business, and (4) the period of
restraint."3 Of these, perhaps the most important is the nature of the business
being bought and sold. There are essentially three classifications into which
most businesses fall: (1) service businesses, (2) those engaged in the distribution
of goods, and (3) those engaged in the production, manufacturing, or processing
of goods.131
125. Id. at 501.
126. Id. The covenant read as follows:
(a) For a period of three (3) years from the date of closing, neither Seller [John Foglel
nor (Karen] Fogle shall, directly or indirectly, engage in any activities within the States
of Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Wisconsin, Tennessee, Pennsylvania or West Virginia either as an owner, shareholder,
director, officer, employee or in any other capacity, on behalf of himself or herself or
any third party, which are competitive with respect to the services provided by the Seller
prior to closing.
(b) Neither Seller nor Fogle shall at any time, or in any manner, directly or indirectly,
solicit or accept any business which is competitive with respect to the services provided
by Company [F & A] prior to closing from any person, firm, corporation or other entity
which is a client of Company at the time of the closing or which had been such a client
of Company at any time within the period of six (6) months prior to the date of the
closing; nor shall Seller nor Fogle in any way, directly or indirectly, request or advise
any client or the Buyer to withdraw any business with Buyer.
Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 503.
129. Id.
130. Drechsler, supra note 117, at 228-60. Note that the Fogle court adopted these factors in
its decision. Fogle v. Shah, 539 N.E.2d 500, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
131. Drechsler, supra note 117, at 228-30. These factors were also accepted by the court in
Fogle. See Fogle, 539 N.E.2d at 503-04.
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In Fogle, F & A was clearly a service business. Ordinarily, a geographic
limitation in a restrictive covenant ancillary to the sale of a service-oriented
business should be localized because services are normally performed within a
small geographic area.' 32 However, the Fogle court found that the territory
covered in the restrictive covenant reasonably extended into many states because
of the nature of the pension consulting business involved. The court did not
specify why the nature of a pension consulting business allowed for such an
expansion.
A second element in determining whether the geographic limitation is
reasonable concerns the effect upon the buyer of including territory into which
the transferring business did not extend at the time of the sale.'33 The issue
before the court in Fogle was whether it was unreasonable to prevent the Fogles
from competing in twelve states completely when in nine of the states F & A
only had four clients, and in one state, Louisiana, F & W had no clients. The
court found that a buyer who purchases a business with the intention of
extending its scope is entitled to bargain with the sellers to prohibit them from
competing within the territory into which the buyer plans to expand."34 Such
an agreement is not against public policy where the area of the geographical
limitation is no greater than that which the parties foresee the expanded business
will cover.'35 The court found that Shah intended to expand F & A's business
throughout the entire territory covered in the covenant and that the. Fogles were
aware of this fact.'36
With regard to the third factor, the extent of the purchaser's original
business, the court found that this also evidenced the reasonableness of the
territorial limitation in question.' Prior to Shah purchasing F & A, Shah
owned a pension consulting firm that had 128 clients of its own. When Shah
hired the Fogles to work for him, the Fogles acquired contacts with many, if not
all, of Shah's original clients. The court concluded that Shah had a protectible
interest in those clients (i.e. in his original business) in addition to the goodwill
acquired when he purchased F & A."
In reviewing the effect of the covenant upon the sellers, the court found that
where the sale of a business is concerned, the effect of the covenant on the seller
is legally insignificant because the seller has willfully and freely entered into the
132. Dreschler, supra note 117, at 230.
133. Fogle, 539 N.E.2d at 504.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Fogle v. Shah, 539 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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covenant and accepted a significant amount of consideration for doing so. 39
Finally, the court examined the effect of the covenant on the public interest.
The court found that any restraint on trade would be slight because pension
consulting firms were common and the loss of one would not tend to restrain
trade or injure the public."4
D. Time Limitations
The final factor a court must find to be reasonable in a restrictive covenant
incident to the sale of a business is the time limitation. In Fogle, Shah paid a
significant amount of money for the restrictive covenants and even hired the
Fogies as employees to work for him. Thus, the court found that the three year
time limitation contained in the restrictive covenant was reasonable in itself. 4 '
Other Indiana courts have upheld time limitations in restrictive covenants
ancillary to the sale of a business. Some of these have been as high as five
years. 42 In general, Indiana courts have not experienced difficulty with time
limitations in restrictive covenants incident to the sale of a business.
E. Severability: The Blue Pencil Doctrine
The blue pencil doctrine is applied in the same manner for a restrictive
covenant ancillary to the sale of a business as it is with a restrictive covenant
ancillary to an employment contract. For the blue pencil doctrine to apply, the
covenant must be clearly separated into parts with some parts being reasonable
and other parts being unreasonable. Although applied in the same manner, there
are no examples of Indiana courts using the blue pencil doctrine in a restrictive
covenant ancillary to the sale of a business.
IV. DRAFmNG TECHNIQUES AND ISSUES
As seen by the above discussion, covenants not to compete are, even when
deftly drafted, sometimes difficult to enforce. Before a good, that is to say
enforceable, covenant not to compete can be drafted, the drafter must have a
139. Id.
140. Id. at 505-06.
141. Id. at 500 (citing Pickett v. Pelican Serv. Assoc., 481 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985)). The court in Picket held that a five year restrictive covenant was reasonable because of the
personal nature of the business, the need to protect the clients, and the significant consideration
given for the covenants not to compete including hiring the Picketts as employees. Picket, 481
N.E.2d at 1118-19.
142. South Bend Consumers Club, Inc. v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 209
(N.D. Ind. 1983) (finding the two year restraint reasonable, but holding that the geographic
limitation was overbroad and therefore unenforceable); McCart v. H & R Block, Inc., 470 N.E.2d
756 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
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clear idea of what he or she is hoping to accomplish with the covenant. Is the
client concerned with retention of employees, protection of information,
retention of clients or some combination of all three? Before an effective
covenant can be drafted, it is important that the draftsman have detailed
knowledge regarding the nature of the employer's business, the type of
employees who will be executing the covenant, and the goals which the client
wishes to accomplish via use of the covenant. The more knowledge the
draftsman is armed with, the more narrowly he or she will be able to draft the
covenant and the higher the likelihood that courts will deem the covenant
enforceable.
Where the goal is employee retention, "a non-piracy provision can reduce
the 'pied piper' phenomenon, in which one highly respected employee defects
to a competitor, and her underlings follow suit. Moreover, it lessens the chance
that a competitor will raid an entire unit or office. ""' 3 Similarly, tying
deferred compensation to violations of the covenant, and/or drafting so called
"golden handcuff" agreements, in which large sums of money are deferred to
a date in the future, can be effective mechanisms for retaining key employees.
Where the goal is customer retention, the draftsman must be as precise as
possible both in terms of the activity that will be restricted as well as with
regard to geographic and temporal limitations. Perhaps most important, the
employer should strive to be as reasonable as possible. If the employer can
satisfy its competitive concerns by a one year restriction, it should not seek a
two year restriction. Similarly, where the employer can be protected by using
a narrower geographic scope, it should be used. This makes it difficult to use
a "generic" covenant not to compete for different types or levels of employees.
For example, a salesperson probably will require a completely different kind of
covenant than will a senior management official.
In any case, even the most careful draftsman of a covenant not to compete
may, when it comes time to enforce the covenant, face difficulties. These
difficulties may arise from the employer's inability to establish appropriate facts
to support the breadth of the covenant with regard to a particular employee, the
fact that there has been a change in job duties subsequent to the time the
covenant was executed thus creating an imperfect fit, or due to a change in the
market or in the business of the employer. For these reasons, the careful
draftsman will take into. consideration Indiana's adherence to the blue pencil
doctrine and draft the covenant so that each of its restrictive provisions is
severable from the others. This will enable a court to strike out those provisions
143. David Lawrence Hankey,A Corporate Counsel's Primer on Restrictive Covenants, PRAC.
LAW., Jan. 1993, at 31, 31-34.
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it deems unreasonable at the time the covenant is sought to be enforced while
leaving intact those provisions deemed reasonable. Where a covenant is drafted
as a unified whole, blue penciling is impossible and will not be undertaken by
the court. In fact, it may be helpful to include, as one of the paragraphs of the
covenant, a section stating that the parties agree that each sentence, term, or
provision of the agreement shall be considered severable and that should one
portion of the agreement be deemed unreasonable, the other provisions of the
agreement will not be affected thereby.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite their fact sensitivity, restrictive covenants are enforceable in
Indiana. There are, however, certain well defined requirements that must be
present in order to have a valid restrictive covenant: the restrictive covenant
must be reasonable; there must be a valid employer protectible interest; the
geographic limitation must be reasonably necessary to protect the employer's
interest; and the time restraint must be (1) related to the employer's protectible
interest, (2) not be so long in time as to injure the employee by precluding that
person from pursuing his or her occupation as a means for support, and (3) not
interfere with the general public by depriving it of the restricted party's industry
or services. It is, of course, the application of these requirements to the
particular facts facing an employer or an employee that can be exceedingly
difficult. The concept of "reasonableness" can vary depending upon the
employer, the industry, and the employee. Nevertheless, employers can take
some comfort in the application of the blue pencil doctrine by Indiana courts.
By "layering" the restrictions, an employer may be able to assure itself, in
advance, that Indiana Courts will find some portion of its covenant enforcable.
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